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The study tries to scratch the relationship between institutions and economic growth under the 
landlocked constraint through empirically growing correlated random effect model with the base 
of pooled ordinary least square model and supporting models of fixed and random effect model. 
It includes a balance panel of 134 nations for 16 periods (2144 observations). It concludes that 
both landlocked and institutions are important variables to increase the output of the country. 
Landlocked nation decreases economic growth by 36% than no-landlocked nations, but the 
estimation of remoteness from the center to nearest sea becomes insignificance. Similarly, one 
standard deviation increase in nine institutional variables individually, out of the seventeen 
variables, estimates ranges from 3%-9% increase in a standard deviation of the dependent variable 
gross domestic product per capita. 
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Although the impact of economic growth is not absolutely debate-free because of 
the inequality, economic growth is generally accepted as an economic barometer that 
indicates the direction of a country's prosperity. The sustainable higher growth rate over the 
long periods will have positive multiplier effect throughout the development1 of the country. 
It will take off from the path of low income country to the middle income country and the 
middle income to the high income country. Historically, the frontier (USA economy) has 
raised its per capita income by nearly 17 fold from $ 3000 to more than $ 50000 during the 
period of 1870 to 2014 (about 150 years) because of an average 2% sustainable economic 
growth, (Jones 2015). Similarly, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan are known 
as four Asian Dragons from their high growth rates (above an average 7%) between 60’s and 
90’s. Japan become world’s second largest economy between 1978-2010 from its post war 
economic miracle of growth rate 10%  in the 1960’s , 5% in the 1970’s and 4% in the 1980’s. 
In Europe, the republic of Ireland is known as Celtic tiger due to its rapid growth rate 
(average 5.9%) between years 1995 to 2008. China becomes the second largest country after 
the year 2010 due to its 30 years of growth rate of average 10% in between 1978-2007. India 
will be the future economic powerhouse and known as new India due to its continuous 
higher economic growth rate average 8.2 % from 2006-2011. All these episodes say that the 
sustainable compounded economic growth makes countries shifting from lower step of 
development ladder towards the upper steps of development ladder or it helps towards 
                                                          
1 Development is taken as a narrow definition which compares only Per capita income across countries. 
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convergence of poor economies to frontier. Interestingly, it is deducing the pace of 
convergence for the newly growing economies than the past pace of frontier.  
The dark part of this story is that practicing development about 60 years after the 
Second World War, economic development has left relatively huge spots of divergences such 
as per capita income, living standard, poverty and social welfare between the OECD 
members and the majority of Asia, Latin America and very poor Africa. Most of the nations 
lying in Africa, Asia and Latin America moving towards black hole of economic development 
because of their slow and unsustainable economic growth. Unfortunately, beyond Europe 
(Switzerland, Austria etc.), all most all landlocked countries (LLCs)2 Afghanistan, Nepal, 
Ethiopia, Botswana, Malawi, Paraguay Burundi, and Zambia are very poor and may call as a 
backwater in economic performances. It has seen that landlocked developing nations are 
relatively growing very poor condition than no-landlocked nations in this world trading 
system. They have borne additional costs (double cost: distance cost of its own and distance 
cost up to the sea port of the transit neighbors and uncertainty of sea access: transit cost of 
official and unofficial embargo). It is arguing that the physical barriers collapse the 
competitiveness (limited of market) in trade within and outside the region and hence it 
adversely affects to economic progress. Now, the question comes. Is landlocked a destiny 
for economic growth and development? Or is geography3 (Ecological zone, landlockedness, 
diseases, and land productivity) matters for growth and development of the nation? If it 
matters, how much geography matters for the economic progress? Therefore, one of the 
concern of this paper is: Is it true that landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) have higher 
                                                          
2Nations do not have sea access or sea port. Excluding the territory of the West Bank, there are 45 
landlocked nations, described from CIA World Fact Book, The Central Intelligence Agency. Non-European 
landlocked nations are known as poor or underdeveloped nations. 
3 The study, however, uses only the narrow definition of geography which is landlockedness and 
distance to sea port.  
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cost than no-landlocked nations (NLLCs)4 to produce economic output? It supports or 
against to the geography matters hypothesis. 
Empirical reports have no support that landlockedness as a sole barrier because some 
European landlocked nations are well developed and also the highest HDI value than USA. 
These nations are not feeling any form of geographical barriers for development. Of the last 
decades, it has been observed an interesting and encouraging improvement in poorly located 
African landlocked economies. A landlocked Ethiopia, called as an African Lion, is reported 
a third fastest growing economy (10% average per annum) of the world. It is the 3rd largest 
coffee producer, 4th largest sesame exporter and the 2nd largest horticulture exporter in 
Africa and has the largest livestock population. Similarly, most of the big investors and 
companies are selecting this nation as a new potential country because of market of 85 million 
population, political stability, huge investment in hydropower, education and infrastructure 
and low labour cost than current Asia and Latin America PIC (2015). In a list of 10 fastest 
growing African economies of KPMG (2014), four landlocked Nations (Rwanda, Botswana, 
Zambia and Uganda) are reported. Similarly, Holodny (2015) has listed 5 LLDCs out of 13 
fastest growing nations are Rwanda, Bhutan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Ethiopia 
ranking in the 12th, 9th, 5th, 2nd, 1st positions respectively. On the other hands, some 
NLLCs such as Mozambique, Guinea, Eritrea, D.R. Congo, Sierra lone are not only growing 
less but also some are performing lower than landlocked nations. Therefore, it is very hard 
to believe that landlockedness is a sole matters for economic growth and development.  
Some other scholars are not agreed that landlockedness is a big matters. Beyond the 
distance and transit access, there are many other constraints envisages by scholars. Bloch and 
                                                          
4 It is defined as a sea coast or sea port nations, described from CIA World Fact Book, The Central 
Intelligence Agency.  
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Tang (2004) have found that countries with superior geography suffering from falling real 
income while others with poor geography are prospering. Instead of geographical hypothesis 
many scholars such as North (1991) and Acemoglu and et. al. (2005) are arguing for 
institutions (private property rights, rule of law, government form, corruption, civil liberty, 
press freedom and so forth) matter greater than geography. Ades Alberto and Chua Hak B. 
(1997) and Paul Collier (2007) are arguing about the issue of bad neighbour rather than 
geography. This is also supported from the report of United Nation, UN (2003), that 
landlocked nations should have good relationship with transit neighbors in order to get the 
sustainable growth and development. Similarly, the hypothesis of infrastructure poor rather 
than landlockedness problem have been discussed by Limão and Venables (2001), Grigoriou 
(2007). An empirical study of Thomas Snow and et. al. (2003) argue that there is no straight 
connectivity problem of distance. Kazakhstan has long distance to move to get neighbor 
port for international trade among the other landlocked nations, but it is enjoying the second 
lowest freight cost. On the other hands, the Malawi is suffered from the highest freight cost 
even in an 803 K. M. port access because its primary trade route blocked by the civil war of 
Mozambique. All these episodes again raise some other questions: Do quality institutions 
matter for economic growth and development? If yes, how much institutions matter for the 
economic progress? Or how much institutions influence to the economic performances of 
the nations?  As a result, it is hypothesizing that Good institutions are able to correct the 
impact of bad neighbors, trade barriers, political instability and infrastructure barrier both 
internal and external, and deficiency of other endogenous variables (physical capital, human 
capital, and technology). 
There are no unique determinants of economic growth, however, the latest decades 
have been focusing towards the determinants of geography and institutions as a key factor 
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for economic prosperity instead of the renowned exogenous and endogenous growth 
models. The growing empirical papers are still in inconclusive crossroad between the triumph 
of geography or institutions for economic growth and development. There are two polarized 
groups: first group are arguing that geographical factors as a triumph and the second group 
are arguing for institutions as a triumph for higher output and economic performances so 
that the study is trying to scratch the impact of institutions on economic growth under the 
landlocked barriers (fusion experiment, a mechanical relationship among income, institution 
and geography, Rodrik, 2000). It is because the past models of development have not 
changed well the face of geographically back-warded and institutionally trapped nations of 
the world. Consequently, it accepts both institutions and geography are the key determinants 
for higher and sustainable economic growth.  
The output of this explanatory paper will be important because it will estimate the 
degree and direction between geography economic growth, and also the relationship between 
predictor of institutions and predicted of economic growth through the new methodology. 
The guideline of this study would be helpful for the policy implications of very poor and 
terribly vulnerable nations of the world. The foundation of the study will call upon additional 
deep research in this area in future too. 
I have organized this paper into five main sections and sub-sections. First section is 
provided literature review which has three sub-sections: geography matter, institution matter 
and institution matter but not clear, and followed by two other sub-sections: mechanism of 
institutions and quality of institutions. Second section is discussed about methodology with 
two sub-sections: data collection and functional relationship, and econometric model. Third 
section is fully concerned about analysis and interpretation of results. The results are divided 
into baseline regression model, pooled ordinary least square (POLS), with two supporting 
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models, fixed effect model (FEM) and random effect model (REM), and the desired of 
correlated random effect model (CREM). More importantly, all explanatory variables are 
standardized, except the landlocked dummy variable, in order to minimize the different scales 





Myriad of literatures are available from geography and institutions to economic 
growth and development. Therefore, this research topic has divided into three parts: 
Geography Matter, Institution Matter and Institution Matter but Unclear.  
Geography Matters. Officially, the first General Assembly of UN (1957) have officially 
realized the problems of landlocked nations and passed the resolution act 1105(XI) as a 
special act among the members’ states to establish and to practice the law of sea access to 
the landlocked nations. The gravity equation, an influential model, argues that the volume of 
bilateral trade determining by two factors: income or GDP between countries and distance 
between the countries. Former factor is directly proportionate and later is inversely 
proportionate with the volume of trade between the countries. James Anderson (2010) cited 




γ. Here, the α, β and γ are elasticity of exporting countries and importing country’s GDP 
and distance respectively and taking values different than one. This gravity equation indicates 
that geography matters for international trade and hence economic growth and development 
through the trade mechanism. It means mostly limiting the export-led growth for landlocked 
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nations and they are far from the international market. Similarly, the highly cited paper of 
Gallup et al. (1998) indicated that "majority population that are far from the sea coast, large 
transport costs for international trade, population in tropical regions of high disease burden 
are the obstacles for the economic growth and development of the country. Coastal and 
temperate economies have high per capita income than landlocked and tropical economies." 
They have noted the huge transport cost counted for the landlocked countries which is the 
especial case of geography linking with economic progress. The UN-OHRLLS (2013) states 
that landlocked countries have a big negative impact on international trade-link for example: 
long distance of sea access from transit neighbours, remoteness from markets, extra border 
crossings, huge transport costs, inadequate physical infrastructure, logistic and institutional 
hurdles. Chowdhary and Erdenebileg (2006) have pointed out that "landlocked nations are 
the most vulnerable nations than the poor developing coastal nations. These nations have 
no fine link to international market (global economic activities)-death of distance, because of 
its seacoast so that these nations are heavily suffering from the geographical fiction to grow 
and develop, and poor socio-economic conditions." Likewise, the transport cost is the major 
cost, making a less competitive international trade for landlocked nations in this capitalist 
world. The cumulative form of transport cost is: long distance of "the international market 
for export, dependency on land and air route for transport", inadequate and inefficient mode 
of transportation, Carcamo-Diaz Rodrigo (2004). Sachs and Warner (1997) have published a 
regression results that the growth elasticity of the sea lack nations to trade is more than half 
(-0.58) lower than transit or coastal nations. Disdier and Head (2009), cited by Moore, have 
shown the meta-analysis of gravity model regression results of trade elasticity of distance is -
0.9; higher than Sachs et. al. . On the same paper Moore has found very high negative 
response of distance on trade (-3.38 to -6.08). 
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On the contrary of geography matters hypothesis, Nurske (1961) believes that there 
is a rising possibility of cheap transport and free trade which decreases both natural and 
artificial costs of transport linking to international trade. It is followed by two important 
studies of complementary geographical aspects: Limão and Venables (2001) and Paul Collier 
(2007). The first paper has argued that infrastructure is an important indicator for landlocked 
nations to integrate its economy. Quantitatively, they have said that "poor infrastructure 
accounted 60 % transport cost for landlocked nations and 40% for coastal nations. An 
improvement in own and transit countries' infrastructure from the 25th percentile to 75th 
percentile overcomes more than half of the disadvantage associated with being landlocked." 
The second paper has portrayed that landlocked nations are poor because of the bad 
neighbors and lack of valuable natural resources. 
Institutions Matter. The worth noting voice of Nobel Prize winner North (1991) that 
institutions are the key determinant of economic growth and development. They are not only 
decreasing the cost of transaction, support to division of labour and solves the human 
cooperation problem but also provides incentives for investment and its directions of  a 
business environment.  Following his argument, Hall and Jones (1998) have found the robust 
reason of huge differences of per capita income across countries from institutions and 
government policies. Again, Rodrik (2000) has concluded from the cross sectional study that 
the quality of institutions trump everything else. Determining the per capita income, 
geography and trade have less influenced than Institutions. Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2002) have denied the location base hypothesis such as latitude, easy access to sea 
and available resources which support for industrialization and economic development. They 
argued that "the successful policy institutions of private property of incentive base 
opportunities raises the investment and modern technological advancement for better 
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productivity and economic prosperity." They have also described the episodes of historically 
poor countries USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia comparing to the richer territories 
of Mughal in India, Aztecs and Inca empires of Americas 1500 years ago. Likewise, 
Acemoglu, and Robinson (2008) argued again that in order to get the successful economic 
results, country should change economic institutions and political institutions (de jure 
political power) together with distribution of political power into the society (de facto 
political power), otherwise, it will be trapped by the de facto political power and hence 
dragging towards the persistence instability and economic doldrums. William Easterly and 
Ross Levine (2002) have strongly argued that institutions matters than geography or location. 
Jones and Romer (2010) have argued that there is four pillars of endogenous variables of 
economic growth: Ideas, Institutions, Population, and Human Capital.  
Institutions Matter, but Unclear. The vague definition of institutions and some empirical 
difficulties of reverse causality, endogeneity and trap of cross country analysis put enough 
room for the criticisms against the power of institutions matter. Institutions (political, 
economic and social) can change the government policies or fiscal policy of the country 
which ultimately moves together favourable to economic growth and development, but, 
there is not clear understanding of the meaning and menu of institutions. Therefore, the 
relationship between institutions and economic growth are not seen straight forward. 
Przewoski (2004) has published a lecture note and questions about the working 
mechanism of institutions. He has strongly shown deep endogeneity (potential bias) issues 
in the empirical analysis of the relationship between institution and economic growth.  He 
said the observed case study is wrong or bias because it is not included the counterfactual 
issues. According to his example of political institutions, the unobserved issues ‘quality of 
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leadership’ is the influencing factor to economic growth rather than political regime 
(democracy or dictatorship). He confirms there are some counterfactual issues in the 
relationship between institutions and economic growth so that comparative analysis is the 
last resort for the statistical inference, however, it has also suffered from five difficulties: 
baseline difference, effect of the treatment on the treated, post treatment effect, distance 
effect and aggregate effect. To sum up, he is quite pessimistic on the strong relationship 
between institutions and economic growth. Similarly, under the criticism of institutions 
matter, Chang (2006) argues that institutions do not describe fully for the matter of economic 
growth and development. He has pointed out three things: First, the causality is not only one 
way from institution to growth and development but also the reverse causality. Second, the 
foundation of institutions, liberal policy, mostly property rights (private property rights) are 
not successful for all countries for the policy implications “against the same size fits all” 
model. Third, he has opposed the conclusion of cross country methodology because of 
institutional heterogeneity of countries. Institutions have not always linear relationship and 
static nature (non-linear relationship and dynamic nature). Therefore, the new institutional 
economists are partially true that institution matters for economic growth and development. 
The great proponent of institutions matter, North (2003), himself has accepted that 
there is no exact lists of quality institutions because everybody is doing trial and error. It is 
not an easy task of copy and pest but it is a cautious path, otherwise, it may backfire too.  It 
has also warned for carefulness and clarity by another proponent economist, Rodrik (2008) 
because the same list of institutions prescribed by international organizations such as WB, 
IMF and WTO will not work to all developing world under the imperfect market 
information. He has argued for require legitimate sets of rules to achieve the development 
goal of the nations. 
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Mechanism of Institutions. D.C. North and other institutional pundits are arguing that 
good institutions such as rule of laws, private property rights are the key to provide incentives 
of business environment to grow private sectors into the economy. These quality institutions 
are link to expand the economy through trade and investment environment. Jeffrey Sachs 
and Andrew Warner (1995) have concluded that if laggard countries want to jump 
successfully from non-qualifying to qualifying categories, convergence of their economy with 
higher level of economic growth of developed nations, they have to follow the path of four 
pillars: reasonable sets of economic and political policies, civil peace, political and civil rights, 
and free economy. Similarly, Rodrik (2002) has shown the deep mechanical relationship 
among income, geography and institutions and also the reverse causality of income to 
integration and institutions and also suggesting that institutions are working for endogenous 
and geography, both direct (Agricultural productivity and morbidity) and indirect (distance 
or sea access), are working for exogenous. In a nutshell, some broader working mechanisms 
are: 
 Protection of the property rights increases incentives to private 
investment and hence booming the economic Growth and development. 
 Good institution means greater efficiency for the use and 
mobilization of resources such as technological progress, innovation and hence 
leading to economic performances.  
 Institutions provide environment for innovation, creating new ideas 
which increases productivity and hence shifting the production frontier upward.  
 Quality educational institutions (schools, colleges and universities) 
and health institutions (hospitals, health centres, and health insurances) determine 
the development of human capital and hence economic prosperity. 
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 Quality financial institutions (banks, co-operatives, stock markets, 
and credit institutions) help to bring financial stability as well as help to the national 
international trade. 
Quality of Institutions. There are no unique lists of quality institutions. Literatures have 
included different lists of predictors relating to institutions for the economic growth. 
However, they are broadly similar in major indicators such as rule of law, private property 
rights, free trade, freedom of policy, control of corruption, civil rights and political stability. 
The Worldwide Government Indicator (WGI) as an institutional Index published by 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón, (1999) have strongly supported by W. Easterly and 
R. Levine (2002) for the data of 31 sources into 6 categories: Voice and accountability (form 
of government, political rights, civil liberties, and independent press); Political stability and 
absence of violence (government thrown by unconstitutional and violent manners); 
Government Effectiveness (quality of public services delivery, competence of civil servants, 
and politicization on civil services); Regularity Quality (government control in market, 
government interference in banking system, regulation in new business and international 
trade);  Rule of Law (private property rights, independent and effective judges, contract 
information) and control of Corruption.  
“Institutions mean various aspects of law enforcement (Property rights, the rule of 
law, legal systems, peace), the functioning of markets (market structures, competition  policy, 
openness to foreign markets, capital and technology), inequality and social conflicts (the 
relation between inequality and growth has been widely studied), political institutions 
(democracy, political freedom, political disruption, political stability), the health system (as 
previously stated, life expectancy is one of the variables most robustly correlated with 
growth), financial institutions (like an efficient banking system or a good stock market) as 
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well as government institutions ( the size of bureaucracy and red tape, government 
corruption)”, Sala-i- Martin (2002). 
Basu Sudip Ranjan (2008) have included 8 types indicators of Economic Institutional 
Quality Index (legal & property rights, law and order, bureaucratic quality, corruption, 
democratic accountability, government stability, independent judiciary and regulation), 8 
types of Social Institution Quality Index (press freedom, civil liberties, physical integrity 
index, empowerment rights index, freedom of association, women’s political rights, women’s 
economic rights and women’s social rights) and  7 types of Political Institution Quality Index 
(executive constraint, political rights, index of democracy, polity score, lower legislative, 




The study is using quantitative methods in order to observe the relationship between 
institutions and economic growth under the constraint of landlockedness. Keeping all other 
variables proxies, the study has assumed institutions are the endogenous variables and 
landlockedness and distance to sea port are an exogenous variables. The key question is: Is 
there any differences of growing output between landlocked and no-landlocked nations? If 
yes, how much is it? The second important question: how is the relative effects between 
institutions and economic growth under the barrier of landlockedness? Do quality 
institutions determine higher per capita income or economic growth convergence? Or, What 
are the economic growth supporting institutions under landlocked barriers? Or, what kind 
of institutions matter for the most?   
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There are several econometric difficulties such as unavailability of unique data, issue 
of cross section data, non-linearity, unobserved variables, and reverse causality. However, 
this academic paper will use balance panel data and divided into baseline regression model, 
POLS, with two supporting models FEM and REM, and at last the desired of CREM. More 
importantly, it removes the different scales of measurement by standardizing all variables 
except landlocked dummy variable before the analysis. Therefore, it will try to mitigate the 
unobserved variables issues such as time invariant variables and unmeasured variables, cross 
section issues, and problem of scale effects, different than previous literature, in order to get 
the proximate conclusions. 
Data Collection and Functional Relationship. The data of institutional variables are 
collected from three major combined sources: The Worldwide Government Indicator 
(WGI), The Heritage Foundation (HF) and Freedom House (FH). The data of geography 
(landlockedness, a controlled explanatory variable) are adopted from the definition of the 
World Fact Book and distance to nearest sea port is taken from the CEPII data base, and 
the dependent variable real Gross Domestic Per Capita Income is collected from the World 
Bank on-line dataset. In order to manage the balanced panel data matrix, it has covered time 
period since 1996 to 2014 and group of all predicted variables are taken from the given online 
data sources. However, some missing observations of nations, variables, are excluded from 
the study. It has also excluded the time period 1997, 1999 and 2001 from the data matrix 
because of the missing observations by source, WGI, and all other indicators collected 
accordingly. The balance panel has 2144 number of total observations ((i=134)*(t=16)). 
Mathematically, the functional form of the study for the landlocked constraint is: 
 
        WP 156/ 2017 
 
 




𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶 = 𝑓(∑ 𝑋𝑖
17
𝑖
, 𝐿𝐿𝐶)  
GDPPC= Gross Domestic Product Per Capita as proxy variables to economic 
growth and development. LLC=Dummy Variables, Landlockedness=1, 0 otherwise; the 
LLC dummy variable has replaced by distance proxy variable in order to get the proximate 
conclusions. All Xi are explanatory institution variables. It is assuming that they are varying 
both individual dimension (within country) and time dimension (multiple time periods), and 
the variable landlockedness and distance are varying only between individuals.  
ccest = Control of Corruption Estimates (X1) 
geest = Government Effectiveness Estimates (X2) 
pvest = Political Stability and absence of violence Estimates (X3) 
rgest = Regularity Quality Estimates (X4) 
rlest = Rule of Law Estimates (X5) 
vaest = Voice and Accountability Estimates (X6) 
polr = Political Rights (X7) 
civl = Civil Liberty (X 8) 
pror = Property  Rights (X9) 
corf = Freedom from Corruption (X10) 
fiscf = Fiscal Freedom (X11) 
govs = Government Spending (X12) 
bisf = Business Freedom (X13) 
monf = Monetary Freedom (X14) 
Gross Domestic Product Per Capita = f (Quality Institutions, Landlockedness/ distance) 
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traf = Trade Freedom (X15) 
invf = Investment Freedom (X16) 
finf = Financial Freedom (X17)   
cenc = Distance from centered of a country to nearest coast or sea-navigable river 
(kilometer) 
Where, data X1 to X6 from WGI; X7 and X8 from FH; andX9 to X17 from HF and it 
is hypothesizes, by theory, that quality Institution > 0; Geography (landlockedness) < 0; cenc 
< 0, and physical capital, human capital and technology are positive but they are assuming as 
proxy variables from the theory of institutions so that they are not included in the model. 
Econometric Model. To choose a single econometric model with quality of both 
unbiased and efficient coefficient is a very difficult task because of the issue of model 
misspecification (omitting variables and including useless variables). In macro econometric 
analysis, mostly, FEM has been chosen over REM because it controls the omitted variable 
bias of unmeasured or unobserved variables or time invariant variables (race, gender etc.). It 
also produces unbiased estimator under tolerable variance. On the contrary, the REM 
produces efficient estimator (lower variance) than FEM. Therefore, it is a very hard to trade-
off between them. Williams (2016) has shown three key points to be understand before 
selecting between FEM and REM. They are nature of the omitted variables, the variability 
within subjects and wishing to estimate the effects of variables. Beyond those supporting  
models, the study has focused on recently growing CREM addressed by Wooldridge (2010) 
which are closely to Mundlak (1978) and Allison(2009) cited by Schunck Reinhard (2013). 
This model estimates the co-efficient of time invariant variables without losing the estimation 
of unbiased property of within estimators which is one of the key independent variable of 
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the study. The path starts from bench mark model of POLS towards the supporting models 
FEM and REM and comparing with the desired CREM at 5% level of significance.  
Suppose, the linear random-intercept model is explain for two variables (y: dependent 
variable and x: independent variable and zi fixed effect time-invariant variable) case. 
Yit=β0+ β1xit+ ...+β2zi ...+µi+Ɛit................... (*) 
Where, xit are explanatory variables which are varying both individual and time 
dimension, zi is a fixed effect time-invariant variables varies only between cluster; βi 
coefficients are required to predict. µi is an unobserved fixed effect error and random 
intercept, and Ɛit is a white noise error terms. The strong assumptions of this model is (µi/xit, 
zi) ~ N (0, σ
2
µ), E (xit, zi) ≠ 0 and E (µi/xit, zi) =0. The FEM model estimated unbiased and 
efficient coefficient through time mean deem or difference approach, but it has collapsed 
both fixed effect time invariant variables zi together with fixed effect error term µi 
(unobserved). The intercept is random because intercept is equal to the sum of intercept plus 
unobserved random fixed effect variables (β0 + µi). Therefore, the model has transformed 




t=1 ) and a cluster (xit − x̅i) component and the model with single time-
variant and single time-invariant variable becomes:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) + 𝛽2𝑧𝑖 + 𝛽3?̅?𝑖 + µ𝑖 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡 … … … … … (1)       
Whereas β1 provides fixed effect estimate (within-effect exactly the same with FEM) 
and the β2 is an unbiased estimation of coefficient zi because it assumes (µi/xit, zi) ~ N (0, 
σ2µ) and E (µi /xit, zi) = 0 and the coefficient β3 is for between effect. It looks like below: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑧𝑖 + 𝜋?̅?𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡 … … … … … (2)       
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Where, µi = πx̅i + vi and  is not the equivalent of model (1) (i. e. between effect), 
but it is a difference of between effects and within effect model i. e.(β3 − β1). More 
importantly, there is exact generalization for more explanatory variables as of this study. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 In Macro economic analysis, FEM estimation has taken as an unbiased 
predictor than REM while analyzing panel data because they control for all measured or 
unmeasured time invariant variables. It is also agreed by the Hausman test (1) (183.59, Prob. 
> chi2=0.0000) (Appendix-A). The statistics reject the null hypothesis meaning that FEM is 
more suitable model over REM. Therefore, the following table is comparing and analyzing 
fixed effect estimations over the estimations of REM and POLS under the controlled 
landlocked dummy variable. 
Table 1: BASELINE  MODELS (LLCs DUMMY) 
(D. V. LGDPPC)              FEM                  REM               POLS    
z_ccest                   -0.0424**       -0.0324*         -0.285*** 
                          (-2.72)         (-2.00)         (-5.85)    
z_geest                    0.0495**        0.0730***        0.528*** 
                           (2.65)          (3.78)         (10.58)    
z_pvest                    0.0341***       0.0312***        0.164*** 
                           (4.03)          (3.57)          (8.03)    
z_rgest                    0.0871***       0.0966***        0.127*   
                           (5.11)          (5.47)          (2.39)    
z_rlest                    0.0637**        0.0848***       0.0314    
                           (2.84)          (3.66)          (0.56)    
z_vaest                    -0.127***       -0.116***      -0.0337    
                          (-6.15)         (-5.42)         (-0.52)    
z_polr                   -0.00464       -0.000308          0.0424    
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Table 1: BASELINE  MODELS (LLCs DUMMY) 
(D. V. LGDPPC)              FEM                  REM               POLS    
                          (-0.36)         (-0.02)          (1.01)    
z_civl                    -0.0787***      -0.0858***        0.123**  
                          (-6.45)         (-6.79)          (2.65)    
z_pror                    -0.0791***      -0.0719***       0.0677*   
                          (-8.42)         (-7.36)          (2.29)    
z_corf                     0.0454***       0.0529***        0.148*** 
                           (4.79)          (5.37)          (4.12)    
z_fiscf                    0.0470***       0.0448***        0.145*** 
                           (7.86)          (7.24)         (10.49)    
z_govs                   -0.00679         -0.0144*         -0.172*** 
                          (-1.01)         (-2.08)        (-10.76)    
z_bisf                     0.0403***       0.0418***        0.135*** 
                           (7.61)          (7.58)          (7.77)    
z_monf                     0.0377***       0.0345***      -0.0403**  
                           (9.70)          (8.54)         (-2.84)    
z_traf                     0.0743***       0.0780***        0.163*** 
                          (16.88)         (17.06)         (10.33)    
z_invf                    -0.0272***      -0.0303***       -0.120*** 
                          (-4.69)         (-5.02)         (-6.06)    
z_finf                     0.0127*         0.0127*        0.00301    
                           (2.12)          (2.05)          (0.15)    
LLC                           0          -0.607***       -0.431*** 
                              (.)         (-5.96)        (-13.02)    
Constant                -3.78e-16           0.163**         0.116*** 
                          (-0.00)          (3.11)          (7.88)    
Observations                 2144            2144            2144    
t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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In OPLS estimations, five explanatory variables ccest, vaest, govs, monf, and invf are 
indicating direction against the institution theory of relationship with GDPPC (negative 
relationship) but except the variable monf  above all four predictors are consistency in FEM 
and REM. Similarly, six predictors geest, pvest, corf, fiscf, bisf, and traf are supporting the 
hypothesis of institution theory. However, comparing two models FEM and REM, nine out 
of seventeen predictors are indicating institutions matter. Observing the FEM, A one 
standard deviation increase in independent variables Government Effectiveness Estimates 
(geest), Political Stability and Absence of Violence Estimates (pvest), Regularity Quality 
Estimates(rgest), Rule of Law Estimates (rlest), Freedom From Corruption (corf), Fiscal 
Freedom(fiscf), Business Freedom(bisf), Monetary Freedom(monf) and Trade 
Freedom(traf), individually, will be predicted to rise 5%, 3%, 9%, 6%, 5%, 5%, 4%, 4% and 
7% unit of standard deviation of dependent variable of GDPPC respectively. Interestingly, 
It has been seen that POLS estimation are quite higher than the coefficients of FEM. 
Likewise, there is a different condition between landlocked and no landlocked nations in the 
rise of per capita income (output). Landlocked nations are 35% (POLS) to 46% (REM)5 less 
capable of producing per capita income (output) than no landlocked nations. In order to 
make better prediction, the study has replaced landlocked dummy variable by the proxy 
distance variable (Distance from center of a country to nearest coast or sea-navigable river 
(kilometer)) to control the influences of institutions on the output of the countries and 




                                                          
5 This is the more accurate estimations, formula applied (100* exp (β^)-1), J. M. Wooldridge (2009). 
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 Table 2: BASELINE  MODELS (DISTANCE) 
(D. V. LGDPPC)               FEM                REM                 POLS    
z_ccest                   -0.0424**       -0.0335*         -0.320*** 
                          (-2.72)         (-2.07)         (-6.17)    
z_geest                    0.0495**        0.0730***        0.581*** 
                           (2.65)          (3.78)         (10.90)    
z_pvest                    0.0341***       0.0304***        0.132*** 
                           (4.03)          (3.48)          (6.26)    
z_rgest                    0.0871***       0.0972***        0.222*** 
                           (5.11)          (5.51)          (3.98)    
z_rlest                    0.0637**        0.0828***      -0.0255    
                           (2.84)          (3.58)         (-0.42)    
z_vaest                    -0.127***       -0.115***       0.0395    
                           (-6.15)         (-5.41)          (0.56)    
z_polr                   -0.00464       -0.000432          0.0417    
                          (-0.36)         (-0.03)          (0.91)    
z_civl                    -0.0787***      -0.0852***        0.158**  
                          (-6.45)         (-6.74)          (3.19)    
z_pror                    -0.0791***      -0.0725***       0.0266    
                          (-8.42)         (-7.43)          (0.85)    
z_corf                     0.0454***       0.0528***        0.206*** 
                           (4.79)          (5.36)          (5.31)    
z_fiscf                    0.0470***       0.0450***        0.155*** 
                           (7.86)          (7.28)         (10.68)    
z_govs                   -0.00679         -0.0133          -0.147*** 
                          (-1.01)         (-1.93)         (-8.51)    
z_bisf                     0.0403***       0.0418***        0.143*** 
                           (7.61)          (7.59)          (7.92)    
z_monf                     0.0377***       0.0347***      -0.0327*   
                           (9.70)          (8.61)         (-2.02)    
z_traf                     0.0743***       0.0775***        0.128*** 
                          (16.88)         (16.98)          (7.73)    
z_invf                    -0.0272***      -0.0301***       -0.126*** 
                          (-4.69)         (-5.01)         (-5.99)    
z_finf                     0.0127*         0.0125*        -0.0322    
                           (2.12)          (2.01)         (-1.60)    
z_cenc                          0          -0.174***      -0.0656*** 
                              (.)         (-3.67)         (-3.97)    
Constant                -3.78e-16       -4.17e-16       -4.39e-16    
                           (-0.00)         (-0.00)         (-0.00)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations                 2144            2144            2144    
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
The estimated coefficients of POLS between table 1 and 2 are different. The 
additional independent variables rgest and civl are statistically significant at 5 % level. 
Although the prediction of FEM is exactly same as of table 1, REM and POLS estimations 
are quite different. The Hausman test (2) (Appendix-A) statistics (178.10, Prob. > 
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chi2=0.0000) reject the null hypothesis meaning that FEM is again more suitable model over 
REM. In addition that the influence of distance is 7% (POLS) and 17% (REM). It does not 
disagree that geographical difficulties matters to the influence of country´s output or per 
capita income. The estimation is indicating very lower percentage of influence of distance to 
dependent variable, GDPPC, than dummy landlocked variables. Furthermore, the following 
table has compared the desired CREM both landlocked dummy variable and proxy distance 
variable.  
Table 3: PROPOSED MODEL (LLCs DUMMY & DISTANCE) 
(D. V. LGDPPC)             CREM            CREMD  
z_ccest                   -0.0424**       -0.0424**            
                          (-2.72)         (-2.72)    
z_geest                    0.0495**        0.0495**  
                           (2.65)          (2.65)    
z_pvest                    0.0341***       0.0341*** 
                           (4.03)          (4.03)    
z_rgest                    0.0871***       0.0871*** 
                           (5.11)          (5.11)    
z_rlest                    0.0637**        0.0637**  
                           (2.84)          (2.84)    
z_vaest                    -0.127***       -0.127*** 
                          (-6.15)         (-6.15)    
z_polr                   -0.00464        -0.00464    
                          (-0.36)         (-0.36)    
z_civl                    -0.0787***      -0.0787*** 
                          (-6.45)         (-6.45)    
z_pror                    -0.0791***      -0.0791*** 
                          (-8.42)         (-8.42)    
z_corf                     0.0454***       0.0454*** 
                           (4.79)          (4.79)    
z_fiscf                    0.0470***       0.0470*** 
                           (7.86)          (7.86)    
z_govs                   -0.00679        -0.00679    
                          (-1.01)         (-1.01)    
z_bisf                     0.0403***       0.0403*** 
                           (7.61)          (7.61)    
z_monf                     0.0377***       0.0377*** 
                           (9.70)          (9.70)    
z_traf                     0.0743***       0.0743*** 
                          (16.88)         (16.88)    
z_invf                    -0.0272***      -0.0272*** 
                          (-4.69)         (-4.69)    
z_finf                     0.0127*         0.0127*   
                           (2.12)          (2.12)    
LLC                       -0.443***                 
                          (-3.82)                    
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Table 3: PROPOSED MODEL (LLCs DUMMY & DISTANCE) 
(D. V. LGDPPC)             CREM            CREMD  
z_cenc                                    -0.0813    
                                          (-1.60)    
Constant                    0.119*       8.07e-17    
                           (2.24)          (0.00)    
---------------------------------------------------- 
Observations                 2144            2144    
---------------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Prediction of the relative effect of institutional variables (both degree and direction) 
in CREM and FEM are exactly the same. Nine institutional variables are capable of 
estimating ranges from 3% to 9% of standard deviation on dependent variable GDPPC, 
while the independent variables are partially rising by one standard deviation. The goodness 
of this model is that without losing the unbiased estimators as of FEM, it predicts the time 
invariant variables (landlocked dummy).  Therefore, the degree of reduction on GDPPC due 
to the landlockedness than no landlockedness is approximately 36% which is nearly equal to 
the value of POLS i. e. 35 % (See table 1) but proxy landlocked (distance) variable is not 
statistically significant.  
Likewise, two separate studies have also shown the similar conclusions. First, the 
estimated coefficients of institutional variables in the FEM and CREM without LLC dummy 
variables are exactly the same (See: Appendix-B). Second, it has further reported the relative 
influence of the institutional and the LLC dummy variables separately for each data base 
WGI, HF and FH. The data base of WGI has shown exactly same negative 36% (table 3), 
and remaining two data base are indicating higher negative degrees 46% and 52% respectively 
(See: Appendix-C). More interestingly, the direction of intuitional variables are almost same 
but degrees are different.  
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The study is trying to answer the current debate of key determinants of institutions 
on economic growth and development under the constraint of geography. Based on this 
econometric analysis, the base line regression model (POLS) suggested that out of seventeen 
institution independent variables, seven variables (geest, pvest, civil, corf, fiscf, bisf, traf) are 
supporting to the theory of institutions which is positively correlated with dependent variable 
GDPPC and four (ccest, govs, monf, invf) are ruling out the same theory and the remaining 
variables are not statistically insignificant. The predictor geest has indicated extremely high 
degree of positive influence on per capita income of the country.  In other words, one 
standard deviation change in rgest variable will change GDPPC by 52% standard deviation 
and the lowest relative influence is made by variable civl which is about 12% standard 
deviation. Comparing to POLS, the FEM and desired CREM has pointing out the lower 
degree of relative influences except the variables of civl and monf. A one standard deviation 
increase in independent variables Government Effectiveness Estimates (geest), Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence Estimates (pvest), Regularity Quality Estimates(rgest), 
Rule of Law Estimates (rlest), Freedom From Corruption (corf), Fiscal Freedom(fiscf), 
Business Freedom(bisf), Monetary Freedom(monf) and Trade Freedom(traf) will be 
influenced positively partially by 5%, 3%, 9%, 6%, 5%, 5%, 4%, 4% and 7% of one standard 
deviation of dependent variable GDPPC respectively. It indicates that institutions are matter 
to increase the gross domestic product of the country. It also indicates the interesting fact 
that landlockedness is also the obstacle of increasing output of the country. Output of the 
landlocked nations are decreased by 36% than no-landlocked nations but the distance 
variable (cenc) does not support the level of statistical significance. It is pointing out an 
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empirical study of Thomas Snow and et. al. (2003), distance does not matter to increase the 
economic output. However, there is an indication that GDP per capita income is decreased 
by approximately 7% and 17%  in POLS and REM respectively (see table 2). 
The result is suggesting that physical geography (landlockedness) is an obstacle which 
is estimated approximately one third amount for the economic growth and development. It 
supports to the "geography matters completely hypothesis" of Tinbergen (1962), Sachs 
(1997) United Nation (1957), Chowdhary and Erdenebileg (2006), and Carcamo-Diaz 
Rodrigo (2004). Similarly, the trade elasticity due to the distance, Disdier and Head (2009) 
and Moore, has portrayed higher than 50%. One may argue that landlockedness is a serious 
cause of poor economic performance outside the Europe but it is equally unanswered why 
are European landlocked nations rich? 
The study has also estimated that institutions are other important factors for 
economic growth and development. More than 50% (9/17 institutional variables) of the 
included numbers of predictors such as geest, pvest, rgest, rlest, corf, fiscf, bisf, monf, and 
traf have exposed the appreciable economic value and desirable direction. And, some five 
variables cccest, ccest, civl, pror, and invf are statistically significant but the direction is 
indicating against the institution theory (inverse relationship with growth and development). 
Similarly, the influence of the institution variables ranges from 3% , political stability and 
absence of violence estimates (pvest), to 9%, regularity quality estimates (rgest),on GDPPC. 
Therefore, no one can absolutely disagree that institutions do not matter, but one can argue 
the partial influences of institutions to GDPPC as of the conclusion of Chang (2006) and 
Przewoski (2004). 
Finally, as of my guess, both physical geography and institutions are the important 
determinants for economic growth and development. This quantitative academic paper has 
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suggested that landlockedness reduces the capacity of growing approximately one third than 
the costal benefits and the proxy distance variable has not shown any clear influences on 
economic performances. Similarly, approximately half numbers of included institutional 
variables are clearly indicating the favor of institution theory. In this situation, It is not an 
easy job to suggest that geography triumph over institutions or the opposite. However, it can 
be argued that unless and until landlocked countries improve their geographical and 
institutional obstacles, there will not have any sign of output or per capita income 
convergence with the frontier. In order to shift the production possibility curve upward or 
to increase the per capita income, landlocked nations have to be focused on reducing both 
of these issues.  
Despite the study has tried additional new academic reference beyond the current 
literatures, it has faced four types of weaknesses. First, it has lower sample size due to 
unavailability of more years of data in the panel (only 16 years with gaps). Second, the study 
has not included the other geographical issues (temperature and agricultural productivity). 
Third, missing of two independent variables: quality of infrastructure, Limão and Venables 
(2001) and good neighbors of Collier (2007) and at last but not least, it has not addressed the 
issue of reverse causality and other possible counterfactual predictors. Therefore, the 
additional work which relaxes above those four issues for further improvement and 
confirmation left to the future empirical study. 
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Hausman Test Result (1) 
. hausman FIXED_Eff RANDOM_Eff,sigmamore 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |   FIXED_Eff    RANDOM_Eff     Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     z_ccest |   -.0424249    -.0323681       -.0100568        .0017503 
     z_geest |    .0495251     .0730147       -.0234895        .0023516 
     z_pvest |     .034077     .0312424        .0028347         .001087 
     z_rgest |    .0871351     .0966365       -.0095014        .0018643 
     z_rlest |    .0636781     .0847806       -.0211026        .0030006 
     z_vaest |    -.127122    -.1156974       -.0114246        .0027538 
      z_polr |   -.0046353    -.0003079       -.0043273        .0009444 
      z_civl |   -.0787231    -.0857969        .0070738        .0013761 
      z_pror |   -.0791307    -.0718681       -.0072626        .0008227 
      z_corf |    .0453865     .0528909       -.0075044        .0008412 
     z_fiscf |    .0469704     .0448243        .0021461        .0007114 
      z_govs |   -.0067854    -.0144021        .0076167        .0008571 
      z_bisf |    .0403236     .0418018       -.0014782        .0002873 
      z_monf |    .0377444     .0345035        .0032409        .0003196 
      z_traf |    .0743251      .078017       -.0036919         .000373 
      z_invf |   -.0271653    -.0302565        .0030913        .0004028 
      z_finf |    .0126788     .0127278        -.000049        .0003823 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
                 chi2(17) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =      183.59 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
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Hausman Test Result (2) 
. hausman FIXED_EffD RANDOM_EffD,sigmamore 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |   FIXED_EffD  RANDOM_EffD     Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     z_ccest |   -.0424249    -.0334828       -.0089421        .0016614 
     z_geest |    .0495251     .0730474       -.0235223        .0022897 
     z_pvest |     .034077     .0304057        .0036713        .0010603 
     z_rgest |    .0871351     .0972298       -.0100946         .001802 
     z_rlest |    .0636781     .0827712       -.0190932        .0028461 
     z_vaest |    -.127122    -.1153023       -.0118197        .0026249 
      z_polr |   -.0046353    -.0004321       -.0042032        .0008987 
      z_civl |   -.0787231    -.0851667        .0064436        .0012841 
      z_pror |   -.0791307    -.0724534       -.0066773        .0007832 
      z_corf |    .0453865     .0527533       -.0073668        .0008101 
     z_fiscf |    .0469704     .0450392        .0019311        .0006753 
      z_govs |   -.0067854    -.0133075        .0065221        .0008022 
      z_bisf |    .0403236     .0417606       -.0014371         .000274 
      z_monf |    .0377444     .0347474         .002997        .0003038 
      z_traf |    .0743251     .0775272       -.0032021        .0003532 
      z_invf |   -.0271653    -.0301494        .0029841        .0003839 
      z_finf |    .0126788     .0124768         .000202        .0003654 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
                 chi2(17) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =      178.10 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
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Dependent Variable z_lgdppc 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                     Fixed Effect    Random Eff~t    CORR_Rando~t    
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
z_ccest                   -0.0424**       -0.0330*        -0.0424**  
                          (-2.72)         (-2.04)         (-2.72)    
 
z_geest                    0.0495**        0.0742***       0.0495**  
                           (2.65)          (3.83)          (2.65)    
 
z_pvest                    0.0341***       0.0300***       0.0341*** 
                           (4.03)          (3.43)          (4.03)    
 
z_rgest                    0.0871***       0.0984***       0.0871*** 
                           (5.11)          (5.56)          (5.11)    
 
z_rlest                    0.0637**        0.0838***       0.0637**  
                           (2.84)          (3.62)          (2.84)    
 
z_vaest                    -0.127***       -0.113***       -0.127*** 
                          (-6.15)         (-5.29)         (-6.15)    
 
z_polr                   -0.00464       -0.000615        -0.00464    
                          (-0.36)         (-0.05)         (-0.36)    
 
z_civl                    -0.0787***      -0.0864***      -0.0787*** 
                          (-6.45)         (-6.83)         (-6.45)    
 
z_pror                    -0.0791***      -0.0722***      -0.0791*** 
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                          (-8.42)         (-7.39)         (-8.42)    
 
z_corf                     0.0454***       0.0531***       0.0454*** 
                           (4.79)          (5.39)          (4.79)    
 
z_fiscf                    0.0470***       0.0448***       0.0470*** 
                           (7.86)          (7.23)          (7.86)    
 
z_govs                   -0.00679         -0.0138*       -0.00679    
                          (-1.01)         (-2.00)         (-1.01)    
 
z_bisf                     0.0403***       0.0418***       0.0403*** 
                           (7.61)          (7.57)          (7.61)    
 
z_monf                     0.0377***       0.0346***       0.0377*** 
                           (9.70)          (8.56)          (9.70)    
 
z_traf                     0.0743***       0.0777***       0.0743*** 
                          (16.88)         (16.97)         (16.88)    
 
z_invf                    -0.0272***      -0.0301***      -0.0272*** 
                          (-4.69)         (-4.99)         (-4.69)    
 
z_finf                     0.0127*         0.0125*         0.0127*   
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Data Using Only for WGI   
Dependent Variable z_lgdppc 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                     Fixed Effect    Random Eff~t    CORR_Rando~t    
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
z_ccest                    -0.114***       -0.102***       -0.114*** 
                          (-5.72)         (-5.04)         (-5.72)    
 
z_geest                     0.102***        0.129***        0.102*** 
                           (4.27)          (5.31)          (4.27)    
 
z_pvest                    0.0260*         0.0228*         0.0260*   
                           (2.39)          (2.06)          (2.39)    
 
z_rgest                     0.138***        0.150***        0.138*** 
                           (6.86)          (7.32)          (6.86)    
 
z_rlest                     0.111***        0.144***        0.111*** 
                           (4.00)          (5.12)          (4.00)    
 
z_vaest                   -0.0931***      -0.0758***      -0.0931*** 
                          (-4.64)         (-3.78)         (-4.64)    
 
Dummy variable lan..            0          -0.595***       -0.362**  
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Data Using Only for HF 
Dependent Variable z_lgdppc 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                     Fixed Effect    Random Eff~t    CORR_Rando~t    
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
z_pror                    -0.0732***      -0.0598***      -0.0732*** 
                          (-7.70)         (-6.04)         (-7.70)    
 
z_corf                     0.0568***       0.0730***       0.0568*** 
                           (5.87)          (7.25)          (5.87)    
 
z_fiscf                    0.0578***       0.0542***       0.0578*** 
                           (9.50)          (8.55)          (9.50)    
 
z_govs                   -0.00549         -0.0149*       -0.00549    
                          (-0.79)         (-2.07)         (-0.79)    
 
z_bisf                     0.0458***       0.0500***       0.0458*** 
                           (8.47)          (8.84)          (8.47)    
 
z_monf                     0.0475***       0.0477***       0.0475*** 
                          (12.14)         (11.63)         (12.14)    
 
z_traf                     0.0785***       0.0839***       0.0785*** 
                          (17.34)         (17.76)         (17.34)    
 
z_invf                    -0.0129*        -0.0128*        -0.0129*   
                          (-2.27)         (-2.15)         (-2.27)    
 
z_finf                     0.0234***       0.0258***       0.0234*** 
                           (3.83)          (4.04)          (3.83)    
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Dummy variable lan..            0          -0.683***       -0.468*** 
                              (.)         (-6.32)         (-4.18)    
 
Data Using Only for FH    
Dependent Variable z_lgdppc 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                     Fixed Effect    Random Eff~t    CORR_Rando~t    
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
z_polr                     0.0775***       0.0730***       0.0775*** 
                           (5.73)          (5.39)          (5.73)    
 
z_civl                     -0.192***       -0.200***       -0.192*** 
                         (-13.01)        (-13.61)        (-13.01)    
 
Dummy variable lan..            0          -0.685***       -0.528**  
                              (.)         (-4.28)         (-3.21)    
 
 
 
 
